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RESUMEN
En este artículo se analizan los cambios en la estructura del mercado laboral y sus implicaciones para la migración. Se exponen
diferentes elementos que deben ser tenidos en cuenta al estudiar las migraciones actuales y los mercados de trabajo, en
concreto la flexibilidad y cualificación de los inmigrantes para realizar determinados trabajos en las sociedades de acogida, así
como la fuerza laboral nativa que compite por puestos de trabajo que hace años no eran atractivos para ella. La del mercado
laboral, las políticas públicas, las fuentes de financiación, el acceso a la mejora en las condiciones de trabajo y de participación
social, además de la fuerza laboral femenina y los movimientos migratorios transnacionales de personas altamente cualificadas
formadas en países desarrollados, impactan directamente en un contexto de crisis económica.
ABSTRACT
Changes in the structure of the work market and their implications for migration are analyzed in this article. Together with these
starting factors, they are exposed the different elements that should be taken into account when studying the current migration
and labor markets, particularly the flexibility and qualification of immigrants to perform certain jobs in their host societies, as well
as the native workforce, who are now competing for those jobs that years ago were not attractive for them. The flexibility of work
market, public policies, funding sources, the access to improvements in working conditions and social participation, in addition to
the female working force and transnational migration movements of highly qualified people previously trained in developed
countries, have a direct impact on a context of economic crisis.
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1. Introduction
I am very much honored to be the keynote speaker here at this conference on immigration. I have been asked
to talk about immigration in the context of the current economic crisis. But I find it very difficult to speak to this
topic here in Spain: My own understanding of both immigration and of the current crisis is based primarily on
the experience of the United States. Moreover, the crisis has taken different forms in different countries, and
even withinEuropethere is substantial variation. So I am going to try to lay out a general framework for thinking
about this problem without pretending to capture the specific experience of each country.
It is conventional to understand migration in terms of an income differential between the sending and
receiving countries; this differential constitutes the reward or return to migration. That return must be balanced
against cost of movement. Short-run policy typically looks to control the migration process by increasing the
cost of policing the borders. And within this framework, the crisis is typically thought of as lowering the return
by increasing the difficulty of finding work or reducing the wages of jobs which might still be available. Since
wages and employment opportunities for migrants are difficult to control in general, but certainly without
affecting national workers and aggravating the crisis, policy tends to focus on border control and on
undocumented workers. Certainly this has been the case in the United States.
But I would submit that international migration has to be understood as structural, embedded in the
technological trajectory of industrial society and the sociology of the labor force. Thus, historically, mass
international migration has grown out of the interaction between the economies of the advanced developed
countries, which generate a demand for labor with certain characteristics that are difficult to find within their
own territory, and foreign labor that has a very different perspective on the labor market from that of national
workers (Piore 1979).
For a long time the trajectory of the industrial world was fairly clear and well defined, and the problems which
that trajectory posed for continuous economic growth and development evident. As a result, the potential role
of international migration and its advantage and disadvantage as a solution to these problems was clear as
well. The trajectory of development is no longer so clear, and that I think is the challenge for migration
research and for immigration policy. The challenge I should make clear is really twofold: On the one hand it is
the confusion about what exactly the trajectory looks like; and on the other, the challenge that the shift in the
trajectory poses for public policy.
Under the old industrial trajectory, the problem was that the economy had a tendency to generate a series of
jobs that national workers found unattractive, often so unattractive that they felt the work degrading and
humiliating. Migrants, particularly from rural, agricultural areas on the fringe of the industrial world, were on the
other hand willing and often eager to perform the work. Their willingness to do so was predicated on the fact
that they thought of their sojourn abroad as temporary. The temporary nature of their commitment to the
foreign jobs meant that they were less affected by any social stigma attached to the work or by the instability,
uncertainty and lack of career advancement, all of which were viewed very negatively by national workers who
thought of themselves as committed to these jobs permanently. Any social stigma attached to the work was
further eased by the fact that migrants performed it in a foreign country out of the eyes of their home
communities in which their identity was rooted. Immigration thus seemed an almost ideal solution to this
particular labor market bottleneck. It also seemed not only to solve the labor market problems of industrial
work, but to contribute to economic development at the place of origin as the temporary migrants return with
developmental resources in the form of capital, skills, and knowledge of the broader market for the goods
they were able to produce. Here too, in fact, the accumulation of funds for investment in productive projects at
home -in agricultural areas, in land, farm equipment and livestock- often motivated the migration process.
Thus, when this process worked well, the migrants took the jobs which national workers did not want, used the
jobs to accumulate capital to invest at home, left after a relatively short period of time. Because one of the
characteristics of the jobs which rendered them unattractive to national workers was their instability, they often
disappeared with the migrants who held them, but if the jobs remained, the initial wave of migrants was
replaced by newcomers with similar motivations. Meanwhile the migrants invested their savings at home in
projects which promoted economic development and expansion there, strengthening the incentives for their
compatriots to return.
Whether or not the process ever worked smoothly in this way, it virtually never did so for a very long period of
time. Out of the stream of initially temporary migrants, a permanent settlement invariably seemed to emerge
sooner or later. Initially temporary workers stayed because it took longer than anticipated to accumulate the
funds which had originally motivated their migration and/or because they formed families and other
attachments at the destination. The emergence of such a settlement has three distinct effects. First, the
motivation and aspirations of the migrants began to shift toward those of national workers. As their time
horizon in the destination country expanded, they become increasingly interested in the job security and
upward mobility offered by the jobs they held and concerned that any social stigma associated with the work
they were performing would come to be attached to them as persons and undermine their stature in their
community and their self-conception as an individual. As their stay became more permanent, they thus
become competitors for the opportunities to which national workers aspired but also less easily managed on
the job and less attractive to their employers as workers. Second, as they settled, the first generation
migrants began to build families around themselves and raise children at the destination. Indeed, the family
formation was often responsible for the changing motivation of initially temporary migrants, and the children
attached to these families, wherever they were actually born, and whatever the aspirations of their parents,
were essentially native to the communities where their parents settled, with the attitudes and aspirations of
native workers. Third, as permanent settlements emerged, the relationship between the original home
community and the new one began to change. People began to move back and forth between the two regions
for different reasons: Family problems which were once invariably resolved by the migrants returning home
were now often addressed by bringing distressed relatives to live abroad; income which was once reserved
for investment projects at home was now retained abroad. Or, when it continued to be sent home, it was
increasingly used to support family members who could not migrate, i.e., for consumption that undermined
work incentives at home rather than for investment in development projects.
The long term viability of migration as a solution to the labor shortage in these basically unattractive short-
term jobs thus depends on the ability of the economy to generate enough stable, secure, and socially
attractive jobs to accommodate the aspirations of the members of the migrant communities as they settle,
and, often more to the point, to make those jobs accessible to them. Thus, while the migration process in its
early stages assures a rough equivalency between the aspirations of the migrants and the needs of industrial
society, there is nothing in the process which assures that equivalency in the long run once the second
generation has emerged.
On the whole, the notion that migration would lead to economic development in the underdeveloped region
has proven to be disappointing as well. Returning migrants often invested in the home region in the early
stages of the migration process, but these regions were seldom the natural locus of development. The
regions were agricultural and development was centered in urban, industrial areas. The skills, as opposed to
capital, which the migrants brought home were trivial because their work abroad was largely confined to
unskilled jobs, and where they did return with industrial skills useful in the developing country, the industries
which employed them were not located in their home communities but in other parts of the country, often as
distant socially, if not physically, as the destinations abroad. When economic development failed to ensue,
more and more of the labor force of productive age was drawn into the migration process. Over time,
therefore, the income sent home was increasingly used for consumption rather than developmental
investment, and the sending community atrophied economically. Many of you have, I am sure, seen the
villages in the late stages of the evolution of the migration process that are dominated by enormous houses in
the style of the places to which the migrants had gone. These villages are empty of all but the aged and young
children, except in certain holiday periods when the migrants came home to visit and boast of their success
abroad.
In this late stage, the migration process has become completely entrenched. The migrant community at
“home” is more and more dependent on the income of the migrants, and at the same time the migrants at the
destination are deeply embedded in the economy there with well established channels for finding jobs for
their brethren and circumventing physical and legal barriers to residence and employment.
The institutional structures that created the spaces in the labor market structure for which the circular migrants
from backward agricultural areas were particularly adapted to fill were greatly strengthened in two great
waves of labor reforms: First in the 1930’s and then in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, in the United States
and also in much of Western Europe. Political pressures in these periods and organized economic actions
such as strikes and street demonstrations, as well as outright civil disobedience, led to enhanced worker
protections and restrictions on managerial authority in the workplace. The pressures were in no small part, at
least in the U.S., generated by second generation migrants reacting against the conditions of work in the jobs
they inherited from their parents. The results were considerable limits on what has come to be known as labor
market flexibility, and especially on the ability of management to layoff and discharge workers in response to
fluctuations in demand. By and large these restrictions were imposed without any corresponding reduction in
the flex and uncertainty of the economy in which the businesses operated. For firms seeking ways of
managing the costs of variability, which they could no longer transfer to their core labor force, a fringe of pliant
migrant workers became increasingly attractive, not only to the firms themselves but to the core labor force
whose working conditions the fringe of migrants helped to sustain. The history in Spainis a little different: Here
the restrictions on layoff and discharge were typically a heritage of the Franco regime, but they were not
challenged in the democratic transition.
 
2. Changes in the structure of the labor market and some implications for migration
Over the course of the last several decades, these processes, which I think capture an important part of the
immigration phenomenon for most of the 20th century, and a good deal of the 19th, has begun to change. The
changes pose significant challenges to how we think about immigration and the policies which we evoke in
an attempt to control it. I will not try to cover all of those changes here -indeed I will not pretend to fully
understand them. But I will focus on two of these, again particularly salient in the U.S., but I think of some
relevance here in Europe as well.
First, there is a change in the institutional environment, basically a move away from the so called rigidities
introduced in the 1930’s and the 1960’s/early 1970’s, giving employers greater latitude to deploy labor as
they see fit and to layoff and discharge workers in response to variations in product demand. To this degree,
the “need” for the kind of malleable labor force which immigrant workers provided, at least in the early stages
of the migration process, has declined. At the same time, the forces of technological change and
globalization appear to be “hollowing out” the job structure. Mid-level jobs, especially in manufacturing,
appear to be gradually disappearing, leaving a bi-modal job distribution, increasingly bifurcated between low
wage unskilled jobs at the bottom and relatively skilled jobs, requiring high levels of education, at the top. We
have yet to see what the net effect of these changes is on the willingness of native workers to take the jobs
which immigrants have traditionally filled. On one hand, there is less need for the kinds of flexibility which
immigrants have supplied and less of the more stable job opportunities which enabled national workers to
escape “immigrant” work. And, of course, the crisis has narrowed the job opportunities of natives still further -
although it has narrowed the opportunities of immigrants as well, in some places more even than those of
natives. On the other hand, many of the constraints which appear to be institutional are actually social: Or
rather, the institutional restraints imposed by law and collective bargaining are an expression of social
attitudes, and those attitudes may continue to affect the way workers behave on the job in ways that impose
costs upon employers and constrain their behavior even when the laws and collective bargaining contracts
through which they were once expressed are no long in force. Thus, national workers may accept the jobs
where there is no alternative but perform poorly in them or express resentment toward management. And
managers may as a result continue to recruit immigrants, whom they view as less resentful and more
malleable, even when national workers are available.
A recent participant observation study of the displacement of black workers in a South Carolina plant by
newly arrived Latino immigrants is particularly to the point here. The study by Laura Lopez-Sanders (2012)
documents how management policy deliberately and self-consciously pushed out the black labor force in
order to replace them with Latinos, whom, according to the comments of the managers quoted in the study,
were perceived as harder working and more malleable employees. The study does not really discuss why
management sought to make this change at this time, but one can speculate that the black labor force was
first recruited in an earlier period when most blacks in the South were coming into industry directly from
agriculture, had little education, and were perceived as particularly pliant and industrious laborers. The rural
labor reserve in the South has now been essentially exhausted and the labor force clearly has other
ambitions. The patterns here are very similar to those we observed in the North in the 1970’s in low wage
urban manufacturing, when Latino immigrants were replacing blacks workers, who had been emboldened by
the black political movement, in urban manufacturing (Piore 1973).
Quite aside from the way in which attitudes toward unstable and/or socially stigmatized work remain even
when the institutions through which they were once expressed are eliminated, countervailing changes in the
native labor force may be working at the same time to increase the demand for pliant immigrant labor. Young
workers who were not yet committed to full-time work, many still in school, once had attitudes similar to rural
migrants: They too were basically looking for income to support leisure time activity or finance their education,
and, like the migrants, were untouched by the social status of the work or its instability because they did not
expect to stay in those jobs after they grew up and/or graduated from school. They thus played a similar role
to that of immigrants in the labor market. But the labor force participation rates among young workers are
declining. Women who in a similar way were willing to take jobs without stability or chances of advancement
because they conceived of themselves as housewives temporarily in the workforce but committed in the long
run to their roles at home, now aspire and have access to permanent jobs with some social standing and
status.
           
3. Highly educated migration
The second major shift in the patterns of immigration which had prevailed in the 19th and 20th centuries has
been the emergence of significant streams of highly educated, skilled migrants moving into positions at the
top of the job structure. This new pattern has attracted considerable attention among policymakers in both the
sending and receiving countries. In the latter, it is often viewed as a net contributor to economic growth and
prosperity in a way in which unskilled migrants who are (generally wrongly) perceived as a net drag on public
resources are not. And, in the United States at least, there has been considerable pressure to redesign the
requirements for residency and work permits to favor this type of immigration. In the developing world, the
emigration of highly educated workers was initially viewed as a brain drain, but more recently the role of the
Diaspora in creating new industries linked to markets abroad utilizing skills and knowledge acquired there
has altered the views of what it might contribute to economic development (although the balance of these
negative and positive features is seldom drawn).
How does the emergence of this new high wage migration change the perspective I have just articulated? An
initial point is that while the specific patterns of these new migrations may be very different, the analytical
framework through which they must be understood is essentially the same. They cannot be understood in
terms of income differentials alone, but rather require an understanding of the structure of jobs and
employment opportunities in the sending and receiving countries, of the sociology and self-conception of the
migrants themselves, particularly relative to that of native workers, and the dynamic through which the job
structure and the self-conception of the different elements of the labor force change over time.
The poster child for the new immigration patterns and their contribution to economic development in both the
sending and the receiving countries is the Indian offshore information technology (IT) industry. My own
understanding of this phenomenon derives from a small but instructive study that I did several years ago in an
attempt to understand whyIndiahad come to be the major offshore software developer for the U.S. but not
Mexico (Piore 2004). IT development requires close personal interaction between the client and the
developer. The need for face-to-face contact is underscored by the fact that a rotating pool of nearly one-third
of the Indian personnel were in the United States on temporary business visas living in hotels, at any point;
anecdotal evidence suggests that number is still very high today. Despite this extensive direct interaction,
constant real time communication by telephone and on chat lines was also required. These contacts should
have been much easier with Mexico which is in close physical proximity to the U.S. and in the same time
zones than with India, which is nearly a full day’s travel away and working on a clock that is almost the inverse
of that in the U.S. Language, which we initially thought was a major barrier, did not seem to be a factor.
The answer to the puzzle of why India and not Mexico is that the groundwork for the Indian industry was laid by
the Indian Institutes of Technology (ITT), elite engineering schools financed by the Indian government. Many of
the undergraduates of these schools came to graduate school in the U.S. in the 1960’s and 1970’s, and then
stayed to make their careers here, moving over time to high positions in the management and engineering
ranks of major U.S. corporations, but maintaining close contact with their colleagues who remained in (or
returned to) India. These India educated, but U.S. based engineers created the bridge which made off-
shoring possible. Highly educated Mexicans who studied in the U.S. have until quite recently tended to return
home to Mexico upon graduation, without moving into the kinds of positions in the U.S. that the Indian
intermediaries held. In this sense, it is the Indian professional network and the way it spread out internationally
that is the key element of the story.
There is a parallel here to the networks through which unskilled migrants navigate the labor market. The Indian
engineers were long removed from the rural agricultural villages that are so central to the low wage immigrant
story (if indeed their families were ever rooted in rural India), but their allegiance and social identities were
rooted in a way similar to the agricultural migrants in their home villages, in the professional communities that
grew out of the ITT, and they moved back and forth between these communities in much the same way that
the low wage immigrants moved back and forth in their transnational villages. A distinguishing feature is that
these professional communities were in turn embedded in an institutional structure that spanned the two
countries and linked them together: Many of the ITT professors had themselves studied in the U.S.,
maintained continuing relationships with their erstwhile teachers and scholars there, and modeled their
curriculums on those of the U.S. universities, updating the Indian curriculums as those in the U.S. evolved.
Thus, the Indian students were able to move seamlessly into graduate education in the U.S.and then back into
the Indian institutions if and when they returned. I will return to the question of whether there are analogues to
these institutional links for low wage communities below.
Less clear in this story is precisely what role these networks play in the actual operation of the IT industry and
its development. The current literature in economics and sociology would emphasize the role of information
and/or trust. But the literature on software development would emphasize the role of tacit knowledge and
face-to-face communication in its development and communication (Brooks 1995, McBreen 2002). By tacit
knowledge, I mean understanding that cannot be communicated through formal instructions, written or verbal
alone, but depends on a shared framework through which verbal instruments are interpreted, and the way in
which interpretation emerges (or perhaps evolves) in face-to-face interaction and communication (Polanyi
1966). In this view, the framework for that communication is laid through education, although not necessarily
through formal classroom instruction. But it is notable that despite the shared background which the
transnational professional community created, so many of the Indian engineers working on a specific
engineering project had to be in the U.S. talking directly to their customer’s engineers at any moment of time.
The IT industry is only one example of high-skilled migration. AnnaLee Saxenian’s work in Silicon Valley
(2002, 2006) and the linkages it established with India, Taiwan and China makes clear that it is not unique.
Still, in other industries, immigrants, despite their professional status, are used in very much the same way as
unskilled migrants to play roles which nationals are unwilling to assume. In the medical care industry, for
example, foreign doctors and nurses are used to fill temporary jobs, or jobs that do not or cannot promise job
security (although they may not actually prove to be temporary), or in isolated rural areas, or to staff hospitals
in very poor urban neighborhoods. Moreover, all high-skilled immigrants do not move in well-established
professional channels. In the U.S., they are attractive to employers in part because the visa system puts
enormous power in the hands of employers; and, it is easier to obtain these visas, and the power over the




International migration is playing out a long run process, creating durable links between the advanced
developed and the less developed world. What initially starts out as a temporary migration facilitating labor
market adjustment that is advantageous to both countries leads over time to permanent settlement. This crisis
is a moment when policymakers would like to take advantage of the temporary nature of the migration to help
absorb the impact of unemployment. And it is certainly a moment when one finds out just how far the process
of settlement has proceeded and how temporary the migration actually is. But it is typically too late to adjust
the process to the needs of the moment. And policy measures such as tighter border enforcement often act
perversely by inducing people who might otherwise have gone home, at least temporarily until the crisis has
passed, to stay and settle permanently.
The structural elements which do affect the nature of the migration process over the long run are, however, in
the process of changing. I have tried to identify some of these changes in the body of this text. Some are
indeed the subject of public policy, such as the policies surrounding labor market flexibility, student financing,
female labor force participation and job access. But again, the crisis is typically a moment when one sees the
impact of these policies, which have previously been obscured by prosperity. But their impact is also long run
and not amendable to short-term crisis management.
The most salient development in international migration patterns in the last several decades, however, has
been the emergence of significant streams of high-skilled, highly educated migrants between developed and
developing countries. These flows may be similar analytically to those of low-skilled migrants but they are
responsive to different structural factors. The one is not a substitute for the other. There is no reason to
believe that the existence of high-skilled migration will affect the forces drawing immigrants into the bottom of
the labor market. And, if we adjust our formal institutions to accommodate high-skilled at the expensive of
low-skilled workers, we will simply drive the low-skilled migration further underground.
High-skilled migration is likely, on the other hand, to complicate the problems generated by low-skilled
migration because it will limit the chances for upward mobility for the second generation. In the United Sates,
foreign doctors have definitely served as a way of circumventing the pressure for the expansion of  U.S.
medical schools. And it would appear that off-shoring of software development toIndiawas an alternative to
the training of software engineers in theUnited Stateswho might have been drawn from the ranks of  U.S.
natives and second generation immigrants.
There are, however, lessons to be drawn from the Indian software industry, and those, I think, have to do with
the role of professional networks in the development and transmission (and conservation) of tacit knowledge.
Natasha Iskander (2010, 2011) has emphasized the role of tacit knowledge and the way in which it emerges
and evolves over time in lower wage migration between the U.S. and Mexico and between France and
Morocco. The processes she identifies are very similar to those in software development, but since the
channels are not institutionalized and the professional communities which emerge in the process not
generally recognized, the transfer of knowledge between countries does not occur and the potential
contribution for the development process is often lost. If we could develop comparable formal institutions, they
would serve as an instrument for increasing the backflow from the migration process to the developing
countries and strengthen the forces promoting circular (and temporary) migration. And this might indeed help
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